Dying To Win Robert Pape Pdf Creator
I often recommend Robert Pape's book 'Dying To Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' to people to learn why the common views of both many of our officials and much of the public are simply wrong on the causes of suicide terror and the effects of our foreign policy. Bradley Mowell otday reminded me that there are good video lectures by and interviews of Robert Pape that go through the data he painstakingly gathered and what it unambiguously says.The VideosI do not usually offer videos because my brain does not work that way: I would rather read something. Highlight it, mark it up and scrawl notes in the margins- and I have a lousy Internet connection. But for people who do like videos, here are what I think are the two best on the subject. Softube plugins torrent.
Pape's book was written in 2005 and updated in 2008. This first video is from 2011. It covers a wider context than the book and specifically talks about the modern ISIS threat, about the Palestinian Two-State Solution and other recent issues. This video, 'The Strategic Logic of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,' is where I would start. Robert Pape.
Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House. On in both dead tree and Kindle format. Robert Pape and James K. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. University of Chicago Press.
Also on. Capitol Books of Dying To Win in paperback and also free to Kindle subscribers.It should be noted that Robert Pape's work is not the last word on the subject. Although his work made a significant contribution to the field, it was just the start of a whole conversation.
Here are some other places you can look to expand on the issue. Max Abrahms critique of Pape's work: Max Abrahms, “Dying to Win,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 176–178.
Max Abrahms disagreeing with Pape that suicide terror is actually effective, specifically arguing that terrorism is almost completely ineffective at achieving policy goals when it primarily targets civilian populations. Abrahms identifies the very different response to Al Qaeda when it concentrated on primarily (or arguably) military targets before 11 September 2001. He also develops a substantial dataset on whether and why terrorism works to achieve policy goals: Max Abrahms. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.' International Security. 2 (Fall 2006), pp.
42–78. 'The data yield two unexpected findings.
First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection.
Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.' Pp 43-44'. Mia Bloom discusses the group dynamics which lead an organization to adopt suicide terror as a tactic. She frames this in terms of the competition between extremist groups for constituency and funding, and how this competition forces them to escalate tactics even when those tactics are ineffective at achieving policy goals.
She also discusses the similar pressures which lead Muslim extremists to incorporate female suicide terrorists even though they were culturally resistant to participation by women at all (terror has a macabre egalitarianism). Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror. Paper for Presentation to the Harrington Workshop on Terrorism. 'Suicide bombing might be considered a tactic of coercive bargaining which includes the risks of outbidding because of the competition among rival organizations utilizing the tactic. Under conditions of group competition, there are incentives for further groups to jump on the 'suicide bandwagon' and ramp up the violence in order to distinguish themselves from the other organizations.' Pp 137. Bloom also goes into the difference between instrumental rationality (goal-based rationality) and value rationality based on 'a conscious 'ethical, aesthetic, religious or other' belief, 'independently of its prospects of success.' Behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices.'
pp 125 and is critical to understanding suicide terrorism. Anne Speckhard extensively documents interviews she and her colleagues conducted in Chechnya and Palestine with the families of suicide terrorists and with failed suicide terrorists (those who survived and were captured or who refused to carry out an assigned mission). These accounts largely support and expand Pape's theories of why suicide terrorists carry out their acts.
Many of the accounts are quite painful and very difficult to read, but it puts a human face on the kinds of circumstances which lead someone to perform so desperate an act. Anne Speckhard. Talking To Terrorists - Understanding the Psycho Social motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & 'Martyrs' to Combat Terrorism In Prison & Community Rehabilitation. Advances Press. September 11, 2012. Conclusion.
This is a complex and difficult topic, intellectually, politically, and emotionally. It is extremely difficult for most people to understand why someone would want to blow themselves up, taking a crowd of people with them and it should be. But only by understanding how we got here is it possible to find rational policies to counter the threat of terrorism. Only by understanding why people do this can we try to keep people from going down the path of violent radicalization in the first place. Although this is a painful topic, it is worth studying in order to protect ourselves, our families, and our communities. I do not have all of the answers.
Hopefully this post will help you start down the road of asking the questions and coming up with answers of your own.
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert PapeRobert Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. In “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” Pape argues that the use of suicide attacks dates back to at least 2,000 years.The great historical irony of this is that the first suicide bombers were Jews attempting to remove occupying forces from their homeland. In the 1st century the Jewish Zealots, an extreme resistance group in Judaea, began sacrificing themselves by making individual attacks on Roman soldiers with knives. They mounted daily attacks and this led to the Jewish War of AD66 which ultimately brought about the exodus of the Jews from the region.Another significant group that employed these tactics were the Hashshashins (also known as the Assassins) in Iran. They used suicide attacks to deter neighbouring sultans in Persia and Iraq from invading.
The strategy continued until the mid-13th century when the Hashshashins were wiped out by the Mongols.The best known example of suicide attacks came in the Second World War. The Japanese, facing defeat in 1944, sent in kamikaze planes against the US navy. More than 30 ships were sunk and thousands of US military personnel were killed or wounded.All three examples ended in failure. However, it did not mark an end to this tactic. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with 17,000 men, tanks and heavy artillery. The following month Hezbollah was created and by November, 1982, the began using suicide bombers against the invaders.
This included the truck bombing in Beirut that killed 241 Americans. As a result Ronald Reagan decided to withdraw all military forces from Lebanon.
By giving into suicide bombers Reagan is the man who did more than any other to encourage the use of this tactic.The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka now began to use this strategy. Over a ten year period they carried out 143 individual attacks and killed 900 people, including Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister.Most importantly, Reagan’s actions inspired a generation of Islamic suicide bombers. There have been more than 160 suicide attacks in Israel. Since 2003 there have been over 350 in Iraq. This has been increasing. In the first half of July there were over 40 suicide bombings in Iraq and 4 in London.Robert Pape challenges the assumption held by people like Tony Blair and George Bush that there is a finite pool of terrorists willing to sacrifice themselves in suicide bombings. Given their limited resources, the suicide bomber is the most effective strategy that people can adopt against the occupation of their country by a major foreign power.
Dying To Win Robert Pape Pdf Creator 2017
They also have several examples of how this strategy has resulted in success (US in Lebanon and Spain in Iraq). Therefore we can expect an increase in the use of this tactic until Israel leaves Palestine and the US and the UK withdraw from Iraq.